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Abstract. Uncertain graphs, a form of uncertain data, have recently
attracted a lot of attention as they can represent inherent uncertainty
in collected data. The uncertain graphs pose challenges to conventional
data processing techniques and open new research directions. Going in
the reserve direction, this paper focuses on the problem of anonymizing
a deterministic graph by converting it into an uncertain form. The paper
first analyzes drawbacks in a recent uncertainty-based anonymization
scheme and then proposes Maximum Variance, a novel approach that
provides better tradeoff between privacy and utility. Towards a fair com-
parison between the anonymization schemes on graphs, the second con-
tribution of this paper is to describe a quantifying framework for graph
anonymization by assessing privacy and utility scores of typical schemes
in a unified space. The extensive experiments show the effectiveness and
efficiency of Maximum Variance on three large real graphs.
1 Introduction
Graphs represent a rich class of data observed in daily life where entities are
represented by vertices and their connections are characterized by edges. With
the appearance of increasingly complex networks, the research community re-
quires large and reliable graph data to conduct in-depth studies. However, this
requirement usually conflicts with privacy protection of data contributing enti-
ties. Specifically in social networks, naive approaches like removing user ids from
social graphs are not effective, leaving users open to privacy risks. Structural at-
tacks to re-identify or de-anonymize users are shown feasible [1] [10]. Recent
surveys on security and privacy issues in OSNs (e.g. [9]) enumerate real-world
breaches and possible defenses. Anonymization is such an effective countermea-
sure with many schemes proposed recently [25, 12, 26, 4, 22, 20, 6, 5].
Given a social graph, the existing anonymization methods fall into four main
categories. The first category includes random additions, deletions and switches
of edges to prevent the re-identification of nodes or edges. The methods of sec-
ond category provide k-anonymity [19] by deterministic node/edge additions or
deletions, assuming attacker’s background knowledge regarding some property
of its target node. The methods falling in the third category assign probabili-
ties to edges to add uncertainty to the true graph. Finally, the fourth class of
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techniques cluster nodes into super nodes of size at least k. Note that the last
two classes of schemes induce possible world models, i.e., we can retrieve sample
graphs that are consistent with the anonymized output graph.
The third category is the most recent class of methods which leverage the
semantics of edge probability to inject uncertainty to a given deterministic graph,
converting it into an uncertain one. In [2], Boldi et al. introduced the concept
of (k,ǫ)-obfuscation, where k ≥ 1 is a desired level of obfuscation and ǫ ≥ 0 is
a tolerance parameter. However, this approach exposes several shortcomings in
the selection of potential edges and the formulation of minimizing the standard
deviation of the sampling distribution. We clarify these points in Section 3.2.
In this paper, we introduce Maximum Variance (MV) approach based on
two crucial observations. First, we observe that nodes gain better privacy if their
incident uncertain edges constitute large degree variance. To avoid the trivial so-
lution of all edges having probabilities 0.5 and to keep the expected node degrees
for utility, we formulate a quadratic program with constraints that the expected
node degrees should be as in the true graph. Second observation emerges nat-
urally from the formation of real networks that display community structure
where new links are largely formed by transitivity. Therefore, we propose adding
potential edges only by distance 2 (friend-of-friend). The extensive experiments
show the elegance and effectiveness of MV over (k, ǫ)-obfuscation. We believe
that the present work suggests an extensible approach for graph anonymization.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
– We analyze several disadvantages in the previous work [2], showing that
their pursuit of minimum standard deviation σ has high impact on privacy
(Section 3).
– We propose MV, a novel anonymization scheme also based on the semantics
of uncertain graphs (Sections 4 and 5). MV provides better privacy and
utility by using two key observations. It proposes nearby potential edges
and tries to maximize the variance of node degrees by a simple quadratic
program.
– Towards a fair comparison between the anonymization schemes on graphs,
this paper describes a generic quantifying framework by putting forward
the distortion measure (Section 6). Rather than Shannon entropy-based or
min entropy-based privacy scores with a parameter k as in previous work,
the framework utilizes the incorrectness concept in [17] to quantify the re-
identification risks of nodes. As for the utility score, we select typical graph
metrics [2] [23].
– We evaluate the MV approach on three large real graphs and show its out-
performance over (k, ǫ)-obfuscation (Section 7).
2 Related Work
2.1 Anonymization of Deterministic Graphs
There is a vast literature on graph perturbation that deserves a survey. In this
section, we enumerate only several groups of ideas that are related to our pro-
posed scheme.
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Anonymizing unlabeled vertices for node privacy In unlabeled graphs,
node identifiers are numbered in an arbitrary manner after removing their la-
bels. The attacker aims at reidentifying nodes solely based on their structural
information. For this line of graphs, node privacy protection implies the link
privacy. Techniques of adding and removing edges, nodes can be done randomly
or deterministically. Random perturbation is a naive approach and usually used
as a baseline method. More guided approaches consist of k-neighborhood [25], k-
degree[12, 6, 5], k-automorphism[26], k-symmetry[22], k-isomorphism[4] and k2-
degree[20]. These schemes provide k-anonymity [19] semantics and most of them
rely on heuristics to avoid combinatorial intractability, except optimal solutions
based on dynamic programming [12, 6, 5]. K-automorphism, k-symmetry, and
k-isomorphism can resist any structural attacks by exploiting the inherent sym-
metry in graph. K-symmetry partitions a graph into automorphic orbits and
duplicate subgraphs. k2-degree addresses the friendship attacks, based on the
vertex degree pair of an edge. Ying and Wu [23] propose a spectrum preserving
approach which wisely chooses edge pairs to switch in order to keep the spectrum
of the adjacency matrix not to vary too much. The clearest disadvantage of the
above schemes is that they are inefficient, if not infeasible, on large graphs.
Apart from the two above categories, perturbation techniques have other
categories that capitalize on possible world semantics. Hay et al. [10] generalize
a network by clustering nodes and publish graph summarization of super nodes
and super edges. The utility of this scheme is limited. In another direction, Boldi
et al. [2] take the uncertain graph approach. With edge probabilities, the output
graph can be used to generate sample graphs by independent edge sampling.
Our approach belongs to this class of techniques with different formulation and
better privacy/utility tradeoff. Note that in k-symmetry[4], the output sample
graphs are also possible worlds of the intermediate symmetric graph.
Anonymizing labeled vertices for link privacy If nodes are labeled, we
are only concerned about the link disclosure risk. For example, Mittal et al. [13]
employ an edge rewiring method based on random walks to keep the mixing time
tunable and prevent link re-identification by Bayesian inference. This method is
effective for social network based systems, e.g. Sybil defense, DHT routing. Link
privacy is also described in [23] but only for Random Switch, Random Add/Del.
Min entropy, Shannon entropy and incorrectness measure We now sur-
vey some commonly used notions of privacy metrics. Min entropy [18] quantifies
the largest probability gap between the posterior and the prior over all items in
the input dataset. K-anonymity has the same semantics with the corresponding
min entropy of log2 k. So k-anonymity based perturbation schemes in the pre-
vious subsection belong to min entropy. Shannon entropy argued in [3] and [2]
is another choice of privacy metrics. The third metrics that we use in MV is
the incorrectness measure from location privacy research [17]. Given the prior
information (e.g. node degree in the true graph) and the posterior information
harvested from the anonymized data, incorrectness measure is the number of in-
correct guesses made by the attacker. This measure gauges the distortion caused
by the anonymization algorithm.
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Table 1: List of notations
Symbol Definition
G0 = (V,EG0) true graph
G = (V,E, p) uncertain graph constructed from G0
G = (V,EG) ⊑ G sample graph from G
du(G) degree of node u in G
du(G) expected degree of node u in G
np number of potential edges, i.e. |E| = |EG0 |+ np
N (u) neighbors of node u in G
∆(d) number of d-degree nodes in G
Rσ truncated normal distribution on [0,1]
re ← Rσ a sample from the distribution Rσ
pi (puv) probability of edge ei (euv)
HiG(u) signature Hi of node u in graph G
2.2 Mining Uncertain Graphs
Uncertain graphs pose big challenges to traditional mining techniques. Because
of the exponential number of possible worlds, naive enumerations are intractable.
Typical graph search operations like k-Nearest neighbor and pattern matching
require new approaches [15] [27] [24]. Those methods answer threshold-based
queries by using pruning strategies based on Apriori property of frequent pat-
terns.
3 Preliminaries
This section starts with common definitions and assumptions on uncertain
graphs. It then reveals several shortcomings in the main competitor [2]. Table 1
summarizes notations used in this paper.
3.1 Uncertain Graph
Let G = (V,E, p) be an uncertain undirected graph, where p : E → [0, 1] is
the function that gives an existence probability to each edge. The common as-
sumption is on the independence of edge probabilities. Following the possible-
worlds semantics in relational data [7], the uncertain graph G induces a set
{G = (V,EG)} of 2|E| deterministic graphs (worlds), each is defined by a subset
of E. The probability of G = (V,EG) ⊑ G is:
Pr(G) =
∏
e∈EG
p(e)
∏
e∈E\EG
(1− p(e)) (1)
Note that deterministic graphs are also uncertain graphs with all edges having
probabilities 1.
3.2 (k, ǫ)-obfuscation and Its Limitations
In [2], Boldi et al. extend the concept of k-obfuscation developed in [3].
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Definition 1. (k,ǫ)-obfuscation [2]. Let P be a vertex property, k ≥ 1 be a
desired level of obfuscation, and ǫ ≥ 0 be a tolerance parameter. The uncertain
graph G is said to k-obfuscate a given vertex v ∈ G with respect to P if the
entropy of the distribution YP (v) over the vertices of G is greater than or equal
to log2 k:
H(YP (v)) ≥ log2 k (2)
The uncertain graph G is a (k, ǫ)-obfuscation with respect to property P if it
k-obfuscates at least (1− ǫ)n vertices in G with respect to P.
Given the true graph G0 (Fig.1a), the basic idea of (k, ǫ)-obf (Fig.1b) is to
transfer the probabilities from existing edges to potential (non-existing) edges.
The edge probability is sampled from the truncated normal distribution Rσ (Fig.
1c). For each existing sampled edge e, it is assigned a probability 1 − re where
re ← Rσ and for each non-existing sampled edge e′, it is assigned a probability
re′ ← Rσ.
Table 2 gives an example of how to compute degree entropy for the uncertain
graph in Fig. 1b. Here vertex property P is the node degree. Each row in the left
table is the degree distribution for the corresponding node. For instance, v1 has
degree 0 with probability (1 − 0.8).(1 − 0.3).(1 − 0.9) = 0.014. The right table
normalizes values in each column (i.e. in each degree value) to get distributions
YP (v). The entropy H(YP (v)) for each degree value is shown in the bottom row.
Given k = 3, log2 k = 1.585, then v1, v3 with true degree 2 and v2, v4 with degree
true 1 satisfy (2). Therefore, ǫ = 0.
(a) (b)
−2 −1 0 1 2
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
 
 
σ=0.1
σ=0.5
σ=1.0
(c)
Fig. 1: (a) True graph (b) An obfuscation with potential edges (dashed) (c)
Truncated normal distribution on [0,1] (bold solid curves)
While the idea is quite interesting as a guideline of how to come up with an
uncertain version of the graph, the specific approach in [2] has two drawbacks.
First, it formulates the problem as the minimization of σ. With small values of σ,
re highly concentrates around zero, so existing sampled edges have probabilities
nearly 1 and non-existing sampled edges are assigned probabilities almost 0. By
the simple rounding technique, the attacker can easily reveal the true graph.
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Table 2: The degree uncertainty for each node (left) and normalized values for
each degree (right)
deg=0 deg=1 deg=2 deg=3
v1 0.014 0.188 0.582 0.216
v2 0.210 0.580 0.210 0.000
v3 0.036 0.252 0.488 0.224
v4 0.060 0.580 0.360 0.000
YP (v) deg=0 deg=1 deg=2 deg=3
v1 0.044 0.117 0.355 0.491
v2 0.656 0.362 0.128 0.000
v3 0.112 0.158 0.298 0.509
v4 0.187 0.362 0.220 0.000
H(YP (v)) 1.404 1.844 1.911 0.999
Even if the graph owner only publishes sample graphs, re-identification attacks
are still effective. As we show in Section 7, the H2open risk in the uncertain
graph produced by [2] may be up to 50% of the true graph while it is only 2%
in our approach. Also note that in [2], the found values of σ vary in a wide
range from 10−1 to 10−8. Second, the approach in [2] does not consider the
locality (subgraph) of nodes in selecting pairs of nodes for establishing potential
edges. As shown in [8], subgraph-wise perturbation effectively reduces structural
distortion.
4 Maximum Variance Approach
In this section, we present two key observations underpinning the MV approach.
4.1 Observation #1: Maximum Degree Variance
We argue that efficient countermeasures against structural attacks should hinge
on node degrees because the degree is the fundamental property of nodes in
unlabeled graphs and if a node and its neighbors have degree changed, the
re-identification risk is reduced significantly. Consequently, instead of repli-
cating local structures as in k-anonymity based approaches [25, 12, 26, 4, 22,
20], we can deviate the attacks by changing node degrees probabilistically.
For example, node v1 in Fig.1a has degree 2 with probability 1.0 whereas
in Fig.1b, its degree gets four possible values {0, 1, 2, 3} with probabilities
{0.014, 0.188, 0.582, 0.216} respectively. Generally, given edge probabilities in-
cident to node u as p1, p2, ..pdu(G), the degree of u is a sum of independent
Bernoulli random variables, so its expected value is
∑du(G)
i=1 pi and its variance
is
∑du(G)
i=1 pi(1 − pi). If we naively target the maximum (local) degree variance
without any constraints, the naive solution is at pi = 0.5 for every incident edge
i. However, such an assignment distorts graph structure severely and deterio-
rates the utility. Instead, we should use the constraint
∑du(G)
i=1 pi = du(G0). Note
that the minimum variance of an uncertain graph is 0 and corresponds to the
case G has all edges being deterministic, e.g. when G = G0 and in edge-switching
approaches. In the following section, we show an interesting result relating the
total degree variance with graph edit distance.
4.2 Variance with edit distance
The edit distance between two deterministic graphs G,G′ is defined as:
A Maximum Variance Approach for Graph Anonymization 7
D(G,G′) = |EG \ EG′ |+ |EG′ \ EG| (3)
A well-known result about the expected edit distance between the uncertain
graph G and the deterministic graph G ⊑ G is:
E[D(G, G)] =
∑
G′⊑G
Pr(G′)D(G,G′) =
∑
ei∈EG
(1− pi) +
∑
ei /∈EG
pi (4)
Correspondingly, the variance of edit distance is defined as
V ar[D(G, G)] =
∑
G′⊑G
Pr(G′)[D(G,G′)− E[D(G, G)]]2 (5)
We prove in the following Theorem that the variance of edit distance is the
sum of edge variances and does not depend on the choice of G.
Theorem 1. Assume that G(V,E, p) has k uncertain edges e1, e2, ..., ek and G ⊑
G (i.e. EG ⊆ E). The edit distance variance is V ar[D(G, G)] =
∑k
i=1 pi(1 − pi)
and does not depend on the choice of G.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
4.3 Observation #2: Nearby Potential Edges
As indicated by Leskovec et al. [11], real graphs reveal two temporal evolution
properties: densification power law and shrinking diameters. Community Guided
Attachment (CGA) model [11], which produces densifying graphs, is an example
of a hierarchical graph generation model in which the linkage probability between
nodes decreases as a function of their relative distance in the hierarchy. With
regard to this observation, (k, ǫ)-obfuscation, by heuristically making potential
edges solely based on node degree discrepancy, produces many inter-community
edges. Shortest-path based statistics will be reduced due to these edges. MV,
in contrast, tries to mitigate the structural distortion by proposing only near-
by potential edges before assigning edge probabilities. Another evidence is from
[21] where Vazquez analytically proved that the Nearest Neighbor can explains
the power-law for degree distribution, clustering coefficient and average degree
among the neighbors. Those properties are in very good agreement with the
observations made for social graphs. Sala et al. [16] confirmed the consistency of
Nearest Neighbor model in their comparative study on graph models for social
networks.
5 Algorithms
This section describes steps of MV to convert the input deterministic graph into
an uncertain one.
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5.1 Overview
The intuition behind the new approach is to formulate the perturbation problem
as a quadratic programming problem. Given the true graph G0 and the number
of potential edges allowed to be added np, the scheme has three phases. The first
phase tries to partition G0 into s subgraphs, each one with ns = np/s potential
edges connecting nearby nodes (with default distance 2, i.e. friend-of-friend).
The second phase formulates a quadratic program for each subgraph with the
constraint of unchanged node degrees to produce the uncertain subgraphs sG
with maximum edge variance. The third phase combines the uncertain subgraphs
sG into G and publishes several sample graphs. The three phases are illustrated
in Fig. 2.
By keeping the degree of nodes in the perturbed graph, our approach is
similar to the edge switching approaches (e.g.[23]) but ours is more subtle as we
do it implicitly and the switching occurs not necessarily on pairs of edges.
Fig. 2: Maximum Variance approach
5.2 Graph Partitioning
Because of the complexity of exact quadratic programming (Section 5.3), we
need a pre-processing phase to divide the true graph G0 into subgraphs and run
the optimization on each subgraph. Given the number of subgraphs s, we run
METIS 1 to get almost equal-sized subgraphs with minimum number of inter-
subgraph edges. Each subgraph has ns potential edges added before running the
quadratic program. This phase is outlined in Algorithm 1.
5.3 Quadratic Programming
By assuming the independence of edges, the total edge variance of G = (V,E, p)
for edit distance (Theorem 1) is:
V ar(E) =
|E|∑
i=1
pi(1− pi) = |EG0 | −
|E|∑
i=1
p2i (6)
The last equality in (6) is due to the constraint that the expected node
degrees are unchanged (i.e.
∑du(G)
i=1 pi = du(G0)), so
∑|E|
i=1 pi is equal to |EG0 |. By
1 http://glaros.dtc.umn.edu/gkhome/views/metis
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Algorithm 1 Partition-and-Add-Edges
Input: true graph G0 = (V,EG0), number of subgraphs s, number of potential edges
per subgraph ns
Output: list of augmented subgraphs gl
1: gl← METIS(G0, s).
2: for sG in gl do
3: i← 0
4: while i < ns do
5: randomly pick u, v ∈ VsG and (u, v) /∈ EsG with d(u, v) = 2
6: EsG ← EsG ∪ (u, v)
7: i← i+ 1
return gl
targeting the maximum edge variance, we come up with the following quadratic
program.
Minimize
|E|∑
i=1
p2i
Subject to 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1∑
v∈N (u)
puv = du(G0) ∀u
The objective function reflects the privacy goal (i.e. the sampled graphs do
not highly concentrate around the true graph) while the expected degree con-
straints aims to preserve the utility.
By dividing the large input graphs into subgraphs, we solve independent
quadratic optimization problems. Because each edge belongs to at most one
subgraph and the expected node degrees in each subgraph are unchanged, it is
straightforward to show that the expected node degrees in G0 are also fixed.
6 Quantifying Framework
This section introduces a unified framework for privacy and utility quantification
of anonymization methods in which the concept of incorrectness is central to
privacy assessment.
6.1 Privacy Measurement
We focus on structural re-identification attacks under various models of at-
tacker’s knowledge as shown in [10]. We quantify the privacy of an anonymized
graph as the sum of re-identification probabilities of all nodes in the graph.
We differentiate closed-world from open-world adversaries. For example, when a
closed-world adversary knows that Bob has three neighbors, this fact is exact.
An open-world adversary, in this case, would learn only that Bob has at least
three neighbors. We consider the result of structural query Q on a node u as
the node signature sigQ(u). Given a query Q, nodes having the same signature
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form an equivalence class. So given the true graph G0 and an output anonymized
graph G∗, the privacy score is measured as in the following example.
Example 1. Assuming that we have signatures of G0 and signatures of G
∗ as in
Table 3, the re-identification probabilities in G∗ of nodes 1,2 are 13 , of nodes 4,8
are 12 , of nodes 3,5,6,7 are 0s. And the privacy score of G
∗ is 13+
1
3+
1
2+
1
2+0+0+
0+0 = 1.66. Note that the privacy score of G0 is
1
3+
1
3+
1
3+
1
2+
1
2+
1
3+
1
3+
1
3 = 3,
equal to the number of equivalence classes.
Table 3: Example 1
Graph Equivalence classes
G0 s1{1, 2, 3}, s2{4, 5}, s3{6, 7, 8}
G∗ s1{1, 2, 6}, s2{4, 7}, s3{3, 8}, s4{5}
We consider two privacy scores in this paper.
– H1 score uses node degree as the node signature, i.e. we assume that the
attacker knows apriori degrees of all nodes.
– H2open uses the set (not multiset) of degrees of node’s friends as the
node signature. For example, if a node has 6 neighbors and the degrees
of those neighbors are {1, 2, 2, 3, 3, 5}, then its signature for H2open attack
is {1, 2, 3, 5}.
Higher-order scores like H2 (exact multiset of neighbors’ degrees) or H3 (exact
multiset of neighbor-of-neighbors’ degrees) induce much higher privacy scores of
the true graph G0 (in the order of |V |) and represent less meaningful metrics for
privacy. The following proposition claims the automorphism-invariant property
of structural privacy scores.
Proposition 1. All privacy scores based on structural queries [10] are
automorphism-invariant, i.e. if we find a non-trivial automorphism G1 graph
of G0, the signatures of all nodes in G1 are unchanged.
Proof. G1 is an automorphism of G0 if there exists a permutation π : V → V
such that (u, v) ∈ EG0 ↔ (π(u), π(v)) ∈ EG1 . For H1 score, it is straightforward
to verify that H1G1(u) = H1G0(π(u)) according to the definition of π.
For H2open score, we prove that ∀dv ∈ H2G0(u) we also have dv ∈
H2G1(π(u)) and vice versa. Because dv ∈ H2G0(u) → (u, v) ∈ EG0 →
(π(u), π(v)) ∈ EG1 . Note that dπ(v) = dv (H1 unchanged), so dv ∈ H2G1(π(u)).
The reverse is proved similarly. This argument can also apply to any struc-
tural queries (signatures) in [10]. 
6.2 Utility Measurement
Following [2] and [23], we consider three groups of statistics for utility mea-
surement: degree-based statistics, shortest-path based statistics and clustering
statistics.
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Degree-based statistics
– Number of edges: SNE =
1
2
∑
v∈V dv
– Average degree: SAD =
1
n
∑
v∈V dv
– Maximal degree: SMD = maxv∈V dv
– Degree variance: SDV =
1
n
∑
v∈V (dv − SAD)
2
– Power-law exponent of degree sequence: SPL is the estimate of γ assuming
the degree sequence follows a power-law ∆(d) ∼ d−γ
Shortest path-based statistics
– Average distance: SAPD is the average distance among all pairs of vertices
that are path-connected.
– Effective diameter: SED is the 90-th percentile distance among all path-
connected pairs of vertices.
– Connectivity length: SCL is defined as the harmonic mean of all pairwise
distances in the graph.
– Diameter : SDiam is the maximum distance among all path-connected pairs
of vertices.
Clustering statistics
– Clustering coefficient: SCC =
3N∆
N3
where N∆ is the number of triangles and
N3 is the number of connected triples.
All of the above statistics are computed on sample graphs generated from
the uncertain output G. In particular, to estimate shortest-path based measures,
we use Approximate Neighbourhood Function (ANF) [14]. The diameter is lower
bounded by the longest distance among all-destination bread-first-searches from
1,000 randomly chosen nodes.
7 Evaluation
In this section, our evaluation aims to show the effectiveness and efficiency of
the MV approach and verify its outperformance over the (k, ǫ)-obfuscation. The
effectiveness is measured by privacy scores (lower are better) and the relative
error of utility. The efficiency is measured by the running time. All algorithms
are implemented in Python and run on a desktop PC with Intelr Core i7-4770@
3.4Ghz, 16GB memory. We use MOSEK 2 as the quadratic solver.
Three large real-world datasets are used in our experiments 3. dblp is a co-
authorship network where two authors are connected if they publish at least
one paper together. amazon is a product co-purchasing network. If a product
i is frequently co-purchased with product j, the graph contains an undirected
edge from i to j. youtube is a video-sharing web site that includes a social
network. The graph sizes (|V |, |E|) of dblp, amazon and youtube are (317080,
1049866), (334863, 925872) and (1134890, 2987624) respectively. We partition
dblp, amazon into 20 subgraphs and youtube into 60 subgraphs. The sample
size of each test case is 20.
2 http://mosek.com/
3 http://snap.stanford.edu/data/index.html
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7.1 Effectiveness and Efficiency
We assess privacy and utility of MV by varying np (the number of potential
edges). The results are shown in Table 4. As for privacy scores, if we increase np,
we gain better privacy (lower sums of re-identification probabilities) as we allow
more edge switches. Due to the expected degree constraints in the quadratic pro-
gram, all degree-based metrics vary only a little. By contrast, (k, ǫ)-obfuscation
(cf. Table 5) does not have such advantages. The heuristics used in [2] only
reaches low relative errors at small values of σ. Unfortunately, these choices give
rise to privacy risks (much higher H1, H2open scores).
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Fig. 4: H2open score
We observe the near linear relationships betweenH1, rel.err and the number
of replaced edges |EG0 \ EG| in Figures 3, 5 and near quadratic relationship of
H2open against |EG0 \ EG| in Fig.4. The ratio of replaced edges in Figures 3,4
and 5 is defined as
|EG0\EG|
|EG0 |
.
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Fig. 5: Relative error
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Fig. 6: Runtime of MV
The runtime of MV consists of time for (1) partitioning G0, (2) adding friend-
of-friend edges to subgraphs, (3) solving quadratic subproblems and (4) combin-
ing uncertain subgraphs to get G. We report the runtime in Fig.6. As we can
see, the total runtime is in several minutes and the partitioning step is nearly
negligible. Increasing np gives rise to runtime in steps 2,3 and 4 and the trends
are nearly linear. The runtime on youtube is three times longer than on the
other two datasets, almost linear to their sizes.
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Table 4: Effectiveness of MV (k denotes one thousand)
np H1 H2open SNE SAD SMD SDV SCC SPL SAPD SED SCL SDiam rel.err
dblp 199 125302 1049866 6.62 343 100.15 0.306 2.245 7.69 9 7.46 20
200k 59.7 3257.2 1049774 6.62 342.3 100.73 0.279 2.213 7.66 9.3 7.43 19.5 0.017
400k 40.7 744.0 1049813 6.62 343.5 101.26 0.255 2.189 7.56 9.1 7.33 18.9 0.030
600k 32.1 325.7 1050066 6.62 343.4 101.73 0.235 2.173 7.46 9.0 7.25 17.7 0.045
800k 29.5 199.2 1049869 6.62 345.9 102.07 0.219 2.163 7.45 9.0 7.24 17.0 0.056
1000k 27.0 140.7 1049849 6.62 345.4 102.29 0.205 2.155 7.34 9.0 7.15 17.0 0.064
amazon 153 113338 925872 5.53 549 33.20 0.205 2.336 12.75 16 12.10 44
200k 30.2 2209.1 925831 5.53 551.5 33.83 0.197 2.321 12.38 16.1 11.72 40.5 0.022
400k 22.8 452.4 925928 5.53 550.2 34.40 0.182 2.306 11.88 15.3 11.28 37.1 0.050
600k 17.8 188.4 925802 5.53 543.9 34.79 0.167 2.296 11.60 15.0 11.04 36.9 0.066
800k 17.2 118.8 925660 5.53 550.0 35.11 0.154 2.289 11.33 14.4 10.81 34.5 0.087
1000k 15.2 82.4 925950 5.53 551.8 35.43 0.142 2.282 11.13 14.1 10.62 31.8 0.105
youtube 978 321724 2987624 5.27 28754 2576.0 0.0062 2.429 6.07 8 6.79 20
600k 114.4 4428.8 2987898 5.27 28759 2576 0.0065 2.373 6.19 7.8 5.97 18.6 0.030
1200k 84.2 1419.2 2987342 5.26 28754 2576 0.0064 2.319 6.02 7.2 5.82 17.9 0.042
1800k 71.4 814.4 2987706 5.27 28745 2577 0.0062 2.287 5.97 7.1 5.78 17.2 0.049
2400k 65.3 595.5 2987468 5.26 28749 2577 0.0060 2.265 5.96 7.1 5.77 16.6 0.056
3000k 62.8 513.7 2987771 5.27 28761 2578 0.0058 2.251 5.89 7.1 5.71 16.4 0.062
Table 5: (k, ǫ)-obfuscation
σ H1 H2open SNE SAD SMD SDV SCC SPL SAPD SED SCL SDiam rel.err
dblp 199 125302 1049866 6.62 343 100.15 0.306 2.245 7.69 9 7.46 20
0.001 72.9 40712.1 1048153 6.61 316.0 97.46 0.303 2.244 7.74 9.4 7.50 20.0 0.018
0.01 41.1 24618.2 1035994 6.53 186.0 86.47 0.294 2.248 7.82 9.5 7.59 19.8 0.077
0.1 19.7 7771.4 991498 6.25 164.9 64.20 0.284 2.265 8.08 10.0 7.85 20.0 0.128
amazon 153 113338 925872 5.530 549 33.20 0.205 2.336 12.75 16 12.10 44
0.001 55.7 55655.9 924321 5.52 479.1 31.73 0.206 2.340 12.14 15.2 11.65 33.2 0.057
0.01 34.5 39689.8 915711 5.47 299.7 27.18 0.220 2.348 12.40 15.6 11.91 32.4 0.101
0.1 19.2 16375.4 892140 5.33 253.9 21.87 0.232 2.374 12.52 15.5 12.06 31.4 0.144
youtube 978 321724 2987624 5.27 28754 2576.0 0.0062 2.429 6.07 8 6.79 20
0.001 157.2 36744.6 2982974 5.26 28438 2522.6 0.0062 2.416 6.24 8.0 6.01 19.5 0.022
0.01 80.0 22361.7 2940310 5.18 26900 2282.6 0.0061 2.419 6.27 8.0 6.04 19.0 0.043
0.1 23.4 5806.9 2624066 4.62 16353 970.8 0.0070 2.438 6.59 8.1 6.36 20.4 0.160
7.2 Comparative Evaluation
Table 6 compares MV and (k, ǫ)-obfuscation. Beside the default strategy NearBy
(nb), we include Random (rand) strategy for potential edges (i.e. selecting pairs
of nodes uniformly on V ). The column tradeoff is
√
H2open × rel.err as we
conjecture the quadratic and linear curves of H2open and rel.err respectively
(Figures 4 and 5). Clearly, MV provides better privacy-utility tradeoffs.
In addition to the re-identification scores H1 and H2open, we also compute
ǫ for k ∈ {30, 50, 100} to have a fair comparison with (k, ǫ)-obfuscation. Table
6 justifies the better performance of MV. Our approach results in lower relative
errors (better utility), lower privacy scores as well as smaller tolerance ratio ǫ
(better privacy). Moreover, the worse results of Random strategy confirm our
second observation in Section 4.3.
The number of potential edges used in MV could be 20% of |EG0 |, much less
than that of (k, ǫ)-obfuscation (100% for c = 2 [2]). Columns |EG0 \ EG|, |EG \
EG0 | show the difference of edge sets between G0 and samples generated from
G. Because the expected degrees are preserved, |EG0 \EG| ≃ |EG \EG0 | in MV
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and are higher than those of (k, ǫ)-obfuscation where the number of edges is
preserved only at small σ, i.e. we allow more edge changes while not sacrificing
the utility.
Table 6: MV vs. (k, ǫ)-obfuscation (lower tradeoff is better)
PRIVACY UTILITY
graph H1 H2open |EG0 \ EG| |EG \ EG0 | ǫ(k = 30) ǫ(k = 50) ǫ(k = 100) rel.err tradeoff
dblp 199 125302 0.00238 0.00393 0.00694
σ = 0.001 72.9 40712.1 6993.0 5280.2 0.00039 0.00122 0.00435 0.018 3.61
σ = 0.01 41.1 24618.2 19317.3 5444.9 0.00051 0.00062 0.00082 0.077 12.03
σ = 0.1 19.7 7771.4 65285.1 6916.8 0.00179 0.00199 0.00245 0.128 11.33
(nb)200k 59.7 3257.2 94508.0 94416.5 0.00033 0.00077 0.00152 0.017 0.99
(nb)600k 32.1 325.7 246155.6 246355.3 0.00017 0.00029 0.00085 0.045 0.82
(rand)200k 118.4 7390.4 69838.0 69917.2 0.00092 0.00206 0.00347 0.036 3.09
(rand)600k 56.4 369.4 202425.5 202530.8 0.00045 0.00077 0.00171 0.078 1.50
amazon 153 113338 0.00151 0.00218 0.00456
σ = 0.001 55.7 55655.9 6158.9 4607.4 0.00048 0.00119 0.00293 0.065 13.40
σ = 0.01 34.5 39689.8 14962.0 4801.3 0.00038 0.00052 0.00066 0.114 21.33
σ = 0.1 19.2 16375.4 39382.6 5650.3 0.00068 0.00102 0.00190 0.145 18.46
(nb)200k 30.2 2209.1 104800.9 104759.9 0.00023 0.00032 0.00065 0.022 1.03
(nb)600k 17.8 188.4 266603.7 266533.7 0.00015 0.00023 0.00047 0.066 0.91
(rand)200k 87.8 7728.6 76417.8 76400.4 0.00071 0.00111 0.00190 0.112 9.88
(rand)600k 43.2 353.0 222055.3 222276.3 0.00042 0.00065 0.00106 0.175 3.30
youtube 978 321724 0.00291 0.00402 0.00583
σ = 0.001 157.2 36744.6 19678.5 15028.5 0.00143 0.00232 0.00421 0.022 4.28
σ = 0.01 80.0 22361.7 62228.55 14914.3 0.00060 0.00105 0.00232 0.043 6.38
σ = 0.1 23.4 5806.9 378566.0 15007.5 0.00038 0.00052 0.00074 0.160 12.20
(nb)600k 114.4 4428.8 213097.3 213371.4 0.00047 0.00063 0.00108 0.030 2.00
(nb)1800k 71.4 814.4 521709.9 521791.6 0.00040 0.00052 0.00090 0.049 1.38
(rand)600k 733.5 108899.3 32325.3 32273.0 0.00092 0.00096 0.00105 0.018 5.76
(rand)1800k 345.0 9888.8 216297.2 216160.3 0.00107 0.00134 0.00204 0.050 5.01
8 Conclusion
In this work, we propose a novel anonymization scheme for social graphs based
on edge uncertainty semantics. To remedy the drawbacks in previous work, our
MV approach exploits two key observations: maximizing degree variance while
keeping the expected values unchanged and using nearby potential edges. Fur-
thermore, we promote the usage of incorrectness measure for privacy assessment
in a unified quantifying framework rather than Shannon entropy or min-entropy
(k-anonymity). The experiments demonstrate the outperformance of our method
over the (k, ǫ)-obfuscation. Our work may incite several directions for future
research including (1) deeper analysis on the privacy-utility relationship (e.g.
explaining the near-linear or near-quadratic curves) in MV (2) generalized un-
certainty models for graph anonymization with constraint of unchanged expected
node degrees.
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A Proof of Theorems
A.1 Proof of theorem 1
Proof. We prove the result by induction.
When k = 1, we have two cases of G1: EG1 = {e1} and EG1 = ∅. For both
cases, V ar[D(G1, G1)] = p1(1− p1), i.e. independent of G1.
Assume that the result is correct up to k−1 edges, i.e. V ar[D(Gk−1, Gk−1)] =∑k−1
i=1 pi(1 − pi) for all Gk−1 ⊑ Gk−1, we need to prove that it is also correct
for k edges. We use the subscript notations Gk, Gk for the case of k edges. We
consider two cases of Gk: ek ∈ Gk and ek /∈ Gk.
Case 1. The formula for V ar[D(Gk, Gk)] is
V ar[D(Gk , Gk)] =
∑
G′
k
⊑Gk
Pr(G′k)[D(G
′
k, Gk)− E[D(Gk, Gk)]]
2
=
∑
ek∈G′k
Pr(G′k)[D(G
′
k, Gk)− E[Dk]]
2 +
∑
ek /∈G′k
Pr(G′k)[D(G
′
k, Gk)− E[Dk]]
2
The first sum is
∑
G′
k−1
⊑Gk−1
pkPr(G
′
k−1)[Dk−1 − E[Dk−1]− (1 − pk)]
2.
The second sum is
∑
G′
k−1
⊑Gk−1
(1− pk)Pr(G′k−1)[Dk−1 − E[Dk−1] + pk)]
2.
Here we use shortened notations Dk for D(G
′
k, Gk) and E[Dk] for
E[D(Gk, Gk)].
By simple algebra, we have V ar[D(Gk, Gk)] = V ar[D(Gk−1, Gk−1)] + qk(1−
qk) =
∑k
i=1 pi(1− pi).
Case 2. similar to the Case 1. 
